The solutions to the ills of democracy lie in more democracy

However, the “high cost” argument holds little weight under inspection. An election costs some MVR 60 (US$ 3.9 million) to MVR 80 million to organise and execute. The cost of a single deputy minister over the course of five years is MVR 2.1 million. By removing just 28 of the hundreds of wasteful, unproductive political appointees in government, we save more money than we would by combining our presidential and parliamentary elections. Were President Muizzu actually sincere in his aim to reduce government expenditure, there are innumerable options to achieve greater returns without jeopardising the integrity and functionality of our systems of governance. Cutting down on the MVR 100 million spent on fireworks and drone shows for the opening of the VIA terminal, or the MVR 20 million spent on his own inauguration ceremony, or the billion-plus Rufiyaa to be spent on reclaiming Rasmalé, are just a few of the very easy ways to save costs that outweigh expenditure on elections by orders of magnitude.

The proposal to combine the elections is a cost-cutting measure, but not one intended to benefit the nation. All it achieves is making it cheaper and easier for an incumbent president to retain their seat of power. Creating a single “grand” election means less money needs to be spent on bribes and voter manipulation, and in a country where the state apparatus is abused with reckless abandon, the consolidation of power becomes even easier. In a single, sweeping election, a tyrannical government can secure all the power it needs to stamp out any dissent, and put citizens into an inescapable vice. For the five years that follow, they are free to do precisely as they please.

The negative consequences of the proposal are, in fact, downright calamitous. Combining elections increases the likelihood of creating supermajorities in parliament in alignment with the ruling parties. Power shifts rapidly within our fledgling democracy, and the swings tend to be extreme – all three of the last presidents held total control of the parliamentary apparatus. These shifts undermine the very basis of our constitution, creating parliaments so thoroughly controlled by a president that it fails in its primary function: holding the administration accountable. 

What we need is not some b*llsh*t “cost cutting” measure intended to insulate our ruling class from the public’s criticism, but a means by which to increase the accountability of our elected officials. It is for this reason that, instead of combining all of our elections, I favour staggering them even more. Using a “mid-term” style election, where half the seats in parliament go up for election alongside the presidential elections, and the other half is elected halfway through the presidential term, we solve the glaring issues of our current electoral cycle, while still strengthening our mechanisms of accountability. The first half of the elections are needed to secure a parliament that can enact the mandate with which a president is elected; the mid-terms can then be a check to ensure that the public still trusts the agenda of the ruling party. If a ruling party performs as per the citizen’s wishes, the mid-terms will only serve to strengthen their ability to bring about serious change; if instead it fails to do so, their ability to do further harm can be quickly checked.

Reforming our mechanisms of governance must also not be limited to changes in our electoral cycle. An area of our constitution that is severely lacking is that of an effective measure of accountability for elected officials throughout their terms. The need is more than apparent; there is little doubt that a vast majority of our current crop of officials, be they parliamentarians or government officials, would be ousted from office if the people had a mechanism to legally do so. 

The only thing resembling a “recall” mechanism present in our country are impeachment protocols in parliament, whereby a supermajority of parliamentarians can pass a vote of no-confidence to remove officials from their positions. The recently passed “Anti-Defection Act” is a similar top-down mechanism, and hardly effective for holding parliamentarians accountable to anyone but party officials. It functions more as a decidedly undemocratic control lever for the president; putting party authorities above the public, empowering them with the ability to remove parliamentarians without any input from the public. Parliamentarians are elected, not to serve a party, but the people themselves. Rather than autocratically removing members from parliament based on party affiliation, the solution to issues caused by floor-crossing lies in creating a mechanism for the people themselves to determine when a parliamentarian has betrayed their mandate.

We politicians are notorious for failing to deliver on their promises. There often comes a point where their failings become grounds for a total loss of public confidence in their ability to serve in office. The recall petition acts as a final measure to allow voters to give voice to an ultimate disapproval of their elected representatives. When conditions are met through the resolution of a citizen-initiated recall, a referendum can be immediately triggered, and a general election called with all haste. The result of the referendum, and whether a recall is truly necessary, will be determined by the people. 

To initiate such a vote, a certain threshold of public interest must first be demonstrated. Given that a majority of voters was required to elect the official in the first place, a large enough percentage of the same voters must express a desire for the official to be removed. 

As a first step, petitioners must collect signatures to submit to the Elections Commission, who must then independently verify the validity of the signatures, before calling a vote if necessary. The exact percentage of voters that should serve as a minimum threshold for initiating a vote is the subject of considerable debate. The numbers required for a successful petitioning of a by-election range from as little as 10 percent in the UK’s house of commons, to upwards of 60 percent of the participating vote in Canadian legislative elections. For the Maldives, with two notably distinct political poles, the number must be high enough that punitive recalls led purely by partisan actors do not succeed, yet low enough that independent citizens can realistically initiate a recall, even without direct partisan support. 

A number between 30 and 35 percent of the total votes cast in an election presents itself as a reasonable threshold for triggering a recall referendum. Based on previous voting records in parliamentary elections, the largest opposition parties during any regime generally claim 25 to 30 percent of the votes. Given that this trend holds, parties must appeal to a group of voters beyond their own partisan allies to reach the desired threshold, while at the same time ensuring that in absolute terms, the numbers are likely still attainable even without party endorsements, given some common consensus.

Of course, limits to the frequency of recall elections must also be established – there is little sense in replacing our rulers at the drop of every hat, and regard must be given to bad-faith opposition actors that might seek to disrupt a legitimately elected ruler’s ability to govern well. While the exact details are up for debate, limiting the possibility of recall to 6 months from the start and end of a term, as well as mandating a minimum of 12 to 18 months between recall votes for the same position, are reasonable restraints to the recall powers that follow practices of modern democracies. Elected officials remain accountable throughout their time in power, but are not so hindered by red-tape and bureaucratic processes that they are rendered useless entirely.

Once a recall vote is triggered, the elections commission will have a set duration of time, likely between a month or two, to verify the petitions and hold the election. The verification process must be foolproof, and require establishment of legitimacy that goes beyond a digital signature. Finally, a vote is held, either for the constituency to which a recalled candidate belongs, or the general public in the case of the president, whereby a clear majority of voters must vote to remove the sitting official, after which the mechanisms for replacing them are immediately triggered. If laws against electoral fraud and voter manipulation are tightened and improved alongside the implementation of such a mechanism, direct recall will vastly improve the accountability of our elected officials. The process is not meant to be easy or convenient– it is the nuclear option, only to be triggered as a last resort for the public. 

To believe such a proposal does not hold its own risks and challenges would be deeply naive. These proposals have the potential to destabilize power dynamics in the country substantially, and open up elected officials to a level of public scrutiny previously unseen in the country. Populist rhetoric, which appears to already have a serious grip on many Maldivians, might potentially be further empowered. Long-term decision making often requires decisions that will have a detrimental impact in the immediate future. However, there is no more goodwill we can afford to give our elected officials, who appear so often to trample on the wills of the people. Even with the theoretical disadvantages of a government that is unable to make decisions that are unpopular, we cannot ignore the reality that our elected leaders, ultimately, often do not have the people’s best interest at heart. It is the responsibility of a leader to win the citizens’ trust, and earn the leeway necessary to enact a difficult mandate. To isolate the powerful from the people using such justification is lazy, cheap, and downright undemocratic.

Frustratingly, the biggest obstacle to these reforms will undoubtedly be the people it seeks to check. Support will be nigh impossible to find among the parliamentarians whose buy-in will be necessary to achieve it: implementation of such a change will require half the elected members to give up part of their term, re-opening their seat after half a traditional parliamentary term. Nor are any elected officials likely to open up the means by which they might lose any of the powers they already possess– it will fall on reform-minded people, to ensure such changes are enforced, through consistent demonstration of an appetite for more, and better democracy.

The very point of a constitution is to act as the bedrock upon which the rest of our legal system is built; to change it is to change the very foundations of our democracy, and it is certainly not a matter to be rushed through without due consideration of the implications, both for today and tomorrow. President Muizzu has shown, again and again, just how little regard he has for our country’s laws and democratic norms. To allow him – or any president for that matter – any opportunity to make the consolidation of power easier is, in my opinion, a grave mistake. It is for this reason that I urge you all to reject his foolish proposal, and instead look toward a solution that brings power closer to the people.

Fayyaz Ismail is a former economic development minister and chairman of the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party.